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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Evidence as to the condition of the refuse, the banana peel or apple core, for
example, may be something to support the plaintiff's contention that the refuse
had been on the floor for some period of time. Anjou v. Boston Elevated Ry.
Co., 208 Mass. 273, 94 N.E. 386 (1911). But see Sisson v. Boston Elevated Ry.
Co., supra, where the company showed also that a porter was constantly on duty
and where the court accepted the company's contention that the bruised condi-
tion of the apple core would not support any inference about length of time
it might have been on the platform. In Vick v. Schoff, (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)
260 S.W. 116, the plaintiff supported his case with the testimony of witnesses who
had seen the company's employees eating bananas on the train. In St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co. v. Daniels, 170 Ark. 346, 280 S.W. 354 (1926), the appellate
court held that an instruction on highest degree of car was proper and that the
plaintiff had introduced enough evidence to get his case to the jury where he
could show that other passengers had kicked other bits of refuse off the same
station platform about the same time the plaintiff had been injured. Cf. Kelly v.
Boston Revere Beach & Lynn R. Co., 266 Mass. 23, 164 N.E. 624 (1929). In that
case the plaintiff had sat upon a needle which was sticking out of a car seat. It
appeared that shortly before that happened the conductor had helped a passenger,
who had been sitting in the same seat, to pick up the contents of a sewing basket
which had been spilled upon the floor. Under the circumstances the court held
that an instruction on highest degree of care was warranted and that the plain-
tiff had made out a case against the company. In the instant case the court
seemed concerned only about the instructions on the degree of care. The court
felt that the instructions had been too favorable for the defendant but that the
error, such as it was, had not affected the plaintiff adversely. It is obvious that
the plaintiff did have a case to suggest how- the banana peel had come to be
where it was and to suggest, too, that the carrier's employees should have
discovered it.
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VATE LANOWNFR.-The plaintiff's eight year old son was accidentally shot and
killed on the afternoon of April 22, 1930 when struck by a bullet fired by an
older boy, one Uccelino. At the time of the accident the deceased was standing
near his home and Uccelino was across the street in a public park. The park
was an open 18-acre tract of land owned, maintained, and controlled by the
defendant city; the management of the park was supervised by a force of city
employees. For a period of seven or eight years promiscuous rifle shooting had
been indulged in throughout the park by many persons who were not members
of any rifle club or similar authorized organization, and the city employees in the
park had been present on many occasions and knew that this shooting was being
carried on. A verdict was entered for the plaintiff parents of the deceased boy in
the sum of $2,259.72, but the trial court rendered judgment for the defendant
city notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that the only negligence shown
had no relation to the physical condition of the park, its equipment or the ordi-
nary use thereof, but at most consisted in the neglect of the city to so police
the park as to keep order. On appeal, held, judgment reversed, the city occupied
the position of a landowner in regard to this park and thus the full proprietary
liability of a private property owner attached to the city and it became liable
for the damages caused by its breach of duty in failing to abate a dangerous




While the municipal corporation in performing or omitting to perform a duty
imposed upon it as an agent of the state in the exercise of strictly governmental
or state functions is generally held not liable in a private action on account of
injuries resulting from the wrongful acts or negligence of its officers or agents,
there is a wide divergence in the decisions as to what functions are governmental
or public and what are private or corporate, and functions held to be govern-
mental in some jurisdictions are held to be corporate in others. 6 McQUIL-
ULN, MuNiciPsA ColoAToNs (2d ed. 1937) 2792. The principle con-
trolling the instant case was first laid down by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court in Honanan v. Philadelphia, 322 Pa. 535, 185 AUt. 1750 (1936),
where the court decided that a municipality in acquiring and maintaining
parks and playgrounds is acting as a landowner and exercises a proprietary
rather than a governmental function and is liable for the improper use of its
property in the same manner as private corporations and natural persons. The
Wisconsin courts have been strict in their classification of those acts coming
within the proprietary functions of a municipal corporation and through the
performance of which tort liability may attach to the municipality. See (1937)
21 MARQ. L. Rav. 96. In an action for the death of a boy on a city owned
bathing beach it was held that as the negligent act causing the act was one being
performed by employees of the defendant city as a proper part of their service
in maintaining and operating a free public bathing beach as a portion of one
of the city parks the city was acting in its governmental capacity and was
exempt from liability. Gensch v. Milwaukee, 179 Wis. 95, 190 N.W. 843 (1922).
The establishment and control of a public playground has also been held to be
a governmental function. Berstein v. Milwaukee, 158 Wis. 576, 149 N.W. 382
(1914). The right to recover from a municipality even for injuries sustained
through the creation or maintenance of a nuisance by the municipality in its
governmental capacity does not exist in favor of a person toward whom the
municipality was acting in its governmental capacity at the time of the injury.
Virovatz v. City of Cudahy, 211 Wis. 257, 247 N.W. 341 (1933). In Erickson v.
West Salem, 205 Wis. 107, 236 N.W. 579 (1931), where a six year old child while
at play drowned in an open ditch at the mouth of a sewer located in a public park
and within six feet of the street, it was held that as the park, sewer, and ditch
were constructed and maintained by the city in its governmental capacity no
liability attached to the city. But where a city operates a bathing beach and also
furnishes water to private consumers it is liable for injuries caused by its failure
to exercise ordinary care to the same extent that a private person or corpora-
tion operating a waterworks would be liable. Nemet v. Kenosha, 169 Wis. 379,
172 N.W. 711 (1919). A survey of the Wisconsin cases comparable with the
instant case reveals that the supreme court has consistently refused to extend
the scope of the so-called proprietary functions of municipalities. While in the
instant case it was held that the ownership and maintenance of a public park by
the City of Pittsburgh was within the scope of its proprietary functions, it
has been held in Wisconsin that the ownership of parks, playgrounds, and
beaches by a municipality are governmental functions. The Wisconsin legislature
in some measure has curtailed the complete freedom from tort liability which
municipal corporations in this state had long enjoyed in their governmental
functions, when by statutory enactment it was provided that municipalities were
not exempt from liability for injuries to persons or property caused by mob
action, [Wis. STAT. (1937) § 66.07], defective roads and bridges, [Wis. STAT.
(1937) § 81.15], or the negligent operation of city-owned motor vehicles [Wis.
STAT. (1937) § 66.095]. However, this action by the legislature has not, up until
1938]
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the present time, influenced the supreme court to "liberalize" its classification of
those acts falling within the proprietary capacity of municipalities; as is evi-
denced by the court's holding in two recent cases above mentioned. See Virovatz
v. City of Cudahy, and Erickson v. West Salem, supra.
JOHN H. RUSSELL.
PAWNBROKERS AND MONEYLENDERS-A PAWNBROKER CANNOT QUALIFY AS A
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE OF NEGOTIABLE STOLEN BONDS WHERE STATUTE REQUIRES
PAWNBROKER TO PUBLICIZE LOANS AND ACCOUNT TO OWNERS OF STOLEN GOODS.-
The plaintiff was a pawnbroker. It was an Illinois corporation. Two negotiable
bonds were pledged with it by a pawnor to secure a loan of $600. The bonds
on their face were worth $2000. The bonds had been obtained fraudulently by
someone from the claimant in the present case. No one in the pawnbroker's
Employ knew of that fact. The third party claimant had notified the office of
the state's attorney that the bonds had been obtained from her. The pawnbroker
made its daily report to the police officials as required by the local regulatory
statutes. The pawnbroker listed the bonds. The state's attorney detected the
missing bonds and demanded that the pawnbroker turn the bonds over to his
office. The pawnbroker complied, but thereafter demanded a return of the
bonds, claiming to have been a holder in due course. When the bonds were not
returned the pawnbroker sued the state's attorney for conversion. The defendant
interpleaded the third party claimant. After a trial by the court the trial court
found judgment for the third party. On appeal, held, judgment affirmed. The
plaintiff was affected by the pawnbroker's statute nothwithstanding its status
in other respects as a holder in due course of negotiable paper. Swesnik Loan
Co., Inc. v. Courtney, (Ill. App. 1937) 10 N.E. (2d) 512.
Whether the plaintiff had given value to the pledgor of the bonds without
reason to suspect any defect on the pledgor's claim was not material in the
opinion of the appellate court. The plaintiff had accepted the goods in pawn.
The company had complied with the statute in making its reports. And the
statute is intended to aid in the recovery of stolen goods. It has been held
that a pawnbroker who can qualify as a holder in due course is protected against
the previous holders of negotiable paper notwithstanding the fact that he has
taken them in pawn. American Railway Express Co. v. Gallant Loan and Mer-
cantile Co., (Mo. App. 1924) 259 S.W. 828; American Railway Express Co. v.
Frienan Loan & Mercantile Co., (Mo. App. 1924) 260 S.W. 1008. It is to be
noted, however, that in these cases there was apparently no pawnbrokers' statute
effective in the jurisdiction where cases were decided. Certainly the courts did
not call attention to any regulatory statutes or ordinances. Courts as well as
legislatures may choose to hold pawnbrokers to a high standard of care in
their business. The doctrine of apparent authority will not be available to the
pawnbroker who lends to one with "authority" only to sell or to display. Silber-
field v. Solomon, 70 Colo. 413, 202 Pac. 113 (1920); Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305,
42 Am. Rep. (1882). The New York court, however, has chosen to extend the
protection of the "Factors' Act" to pawnbrokers. Nelkin v. Providence Loan
Society of New York, 265 N.Y. 393, 193 N.E. 245 (1934).
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